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Abstract: Several leading indicators of corruption point to a serious problem in India on 
whole.  Yet what explains the substantial variance of corruption levels perceived and 
experienced by citizens across Indian states?  Surprisingly little research in the field has 
addressed this important question.  This analysis elucidates a number of relevant and 
testable hypotheses from the growing literature on the determinants of corruption and 
applies them to the case of the Indian states.  The estimates of the empirical models show 
that the level of development – measured both in economic and education terms – and the 
level of fiscal decentralization are significant and negatively related with levels of 
corruption.  Factors such as income inequality, religious fractionalization, media 
exposure and whether a state has a bicameral or a unicameral legislature are statistically 
insignificant.   
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      Corruption in the public sector hinders economic growth (Mauro 1995; Bliss and Di 
Tella 1997), reduces trust, legitimcay and social capital (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) and 
leads to greater political instability (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) while systematically 
hurting the poor, by reducing the efficiency of the provision of public goods to citizens1.  
According to several sources ranking countries on corruption, India, a transitioning 
country in many respects yet a stable democracy, generally ranks among the middle to 
lower half of countries surveyed in multiple samples2.  On its face, relative most other 
countries, it would seem that India generally has a moderate to large problem with 
corruption as a country on whole.  While this may indeed be the case, as a strong federal 
country with a relatively high degree of political and fiscal decentralization, corruption 
levels are not monolithic across the country, and in fact, rent-seeking varies significantly 
from state to state.  For example, while citizens in Kerala and Himachal Pradesh have 
comparatively limited personal experience with - and low perception of - corruption in 
their states, the public services in regions like Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir appear to 
be fraught with rent-seeking.  What explains such variation among Indian states?   
          While numerous recent studies have identified several determinants of corruption 
at sub-national levels for other federal or semi-federal states such as the United States 
(Alt and Lassen 2003 and 2008; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Goel and Nelson 1998) Brazil 
(Ferraz and Finan 2008), Italy (Del Monte and Papagni 2007), India has received 
surprisingly little focus.  As the world’s largest democracy and containing 10 states with 
                                                 
1 Transparency International Country Report India 2008 
2 For example, in Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI) of 2008, India ranked 
85th out to 180.  Similarly, in the World Bank’s survey on control of corruption, India was in the 47th 
percentile in 2007.   
 2
populations over 50 million inhabitants, it is critical for scholars and policy-makers to 
have a better understanding of then problem of corruption within this diverse and 
populous state.   
        This analysis seeks to elucidate the determinants of corruption in Indian states by 
employing the largest in-country survey ever conducted on citizen perceptions and 
experience with corruption.  In 2005, more than 14,000 citizens in 20 of India’s 28 states 
were asked about their personal experiences and perceptions with corruption in the public 
sector for services that are provided by state-level governments.  Upon surveying the 
literature of the determinants of corruption, I test five hypotheses for which data is 
available and that appear to apply well to the case of India.  Based on the findings in the 
empirical analysis, I report thee significant factors that receive strong empirical support.  
One, wealthier states are less corrupt on average.  Two, states with higher levels of 
education are less corrupt than those with lower aggregate levels.  Finally, states that are 
more fiscally decentralized, in that they are more reliant on their own citizens for 
revenues rather than federal transfers, are less corrupt than those which are more 
dependent on the federal government for funds.   
         The remainder of this analysis goes as follows.  In the next two sections I review 
the literature on the determinants of corruption, beginning briefly by discussing the 
findings of several other studies looking at corruption at the sub-national level.  
Additionally, in this section I elucidate five testable hypotheses.  Next I discuss in detail 
the survey data which is used as the dependent variable of the study, followed by the data 
used to test the hypotheses.  Subsequently, I report the findings of the cross-section 
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analysis and show a number of bivariate analyses.  I conclude with a summary of the 
results and some policy recommendations based on the findings.   
 
 
Explanations of Corruption in Sub-National Governments 
 
         What of course makes the sub-national level of analysis attractive is the idea that 
many of the oftentimes complex control variables, such levels of democracy, rule of law, 
electoral systems, colonial heritage, press freedom, etc. are somewhat ‘naturally’ 
controlled for by looking at variations in regions within a single country.  The drawback 
is of course when data is limited to one year (as in the case of the survey data here), the 
sample size is restricted to a relatively small number of cases, making sweeping 
generalizations based on the results rather unrealistic.  Keeping in mind this trade-off, 
several recent studies have looked into corruption within federal countries at the 
provincial/ state level, most of which focusing on variation within the U.S. states.  For 
example, along with relative wealth and the levels of bureaucrat salaries, Alt and Lassen 
(2003) find that electoral institutions such as campaign expenditure restrictions, direct 
initiatives and open primaries all are associated with lower corruption, while thresholds 
on direct initiatives are associated with higher levels of corruption in U.S. states on 
average.  In a further study on the effects of divided verses unified government, Alt and 
Lassen (2008) report that divided government along with a separately elected judiciary 
are correlated with lower corruption on average, while in the case of a unified 
government; a separately elected judiciary has an especially strong effect on curbing 
corruption.  Looking at the number of corruption convictions in U.S. states, Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) find that education, size of the public sector and income levels are associated 
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less corruption convictions, while income inequality is positively correlated with the 
dependent variable.  Conversely, with respect to the size of the public sector, Goel and 
Nelson (1998) find that higher state involvement in the economy is associated with 
higher corruption convictions in U.S. states.   
        In federal systems outside the U.S., Ferraz and Finan (2008) explore the effect of a 
recent anti-corruption measure taken by the Brazilian government in 2004 and find that 
accountability in regions where media consumption was higher on average played a 
significant role in holding incumbents accountable when exposed for fraud in receiving 
federal transfers.  Francken et al (2005) demonstrate a similar relationship with the media 
in regions in Madagascar and find that higher media consumption constrains rent-seeking 
in education programs, and further, in poorer areas, radio consumption is especially 
effective.  In Italian regions from 1963 to 2001, Del Monte and Papagni (2007) find that 
economic development, party concentration of power, civic organizations, and 
government consumption all significantly impact the levels of corruption convictions.  
From this literature, along with a vast cross-section literature on the determinants of 
corruption, I draw on five hypotheses which I test that are of particular interest and 
applicability to the Indian states.   
 
Additional Literature and the Hypotheses 
1. Higher Levels of Income and Education 
    In most all studies of the determinants of corruption – whether at the national or sub-
national level – studies have found that most affluent and better educated countries or 
regions are associated with lower levels of corruption.  Essentially, the theoretical 
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foundations for this hypothesis come from Lipset’s theory of modernization (Lipset 
1960) combined with the standard principle-agent model oftentimes employed in the 
corruption literature (Rose-Ackerman 1975). Lipset posits that as citizens (the agents) 
become wealthier and better educated they will be more capable of monitoring their 
public representatives (the principle).  Due to the greater likelihood of being caught, 
incentives are reduced for politicians and bureaucrats to engage in rent-seeking 
behaviour.  The higher levels of wealth also give more citizens the resources to mobilize 
and take action against corrupt public officials.  This sentiment is essentially echoed by 
Huntington (1968), in that he claims that in earlier stages of development there are 
greater opportunities for corruption due to the changes in the socio-economic system of 
the state.  Numerous studies have shown strong empirical support for the impact of 
income and education on corruption (Treisman 2000; Alt and Lasson 2003; La Porta et al 
1999; Montinola and Jackman 2002).  We would thus hypothesize that regions in India 
with greater levels of education and affluence, would, on average, be less corrupt.   
 
2. The Heterogeneity/ Fractionalization Hypothesis 
        India, a country of 1.16 billion inhabitants, is a country with high levels of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious diversity3.  It has two major ethnic groups (Indo-Aryan and 
Dravidian), 15 official languages and at least 5 major religious (Hindu, Islam, 
Christianity, Buddhism and Sikh)4.  Thus a discussion about the effects of heterogeneity 
on corruption applies quite well in the case of India.  As Mauro (1995) argues, regions or 
countries with higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization might reduce the 
                                                 
3 See CIA fact book on India: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html  
4 ibid 
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likelihood that citizens will oppose or penalize corrupt public officials.  Citizens are more 
apt to back a politician that is of their religion or ethnicity and in return, leaders of 
various groups might be more inclined to allocate resources in a systematically unfair 
way to benefit their own ethnic, religious or linguistic group.  Several studies have found 
evidence suggesting that on average, greater diversity is associated with higher levels of 
corruption (Alesina et al 2003; La Porta et al 1999; Charron 2009).  We would thus 
expect that, ceteris paribus, regions that have greater levels of heterogeneity will be more 
susceptible to clientalism and politics of division that lead to greater corruption in the 
public sector.   
 
3. Income Inequality Hypothesis 
       Although admittedly it is next to impossible to distinguish a distinct causal direction 
between these two variables, inequality and corruption are expected to be related.  
Several recent studies have demonstrated a significant relationship between these two 
variable, with some finding that corruption has a positive effect on income inequality 
(Gupta et al 2002; Gyimah-Brempong 2002) and others showing support that inequality 
increases corruption, in particular in democratic states (You and Khagram 2004).   The 
argument as to why these two forces are related is rather strait-forward.  In areas that are 
more unequal, more of the citizens will of course be poorer, which should compel them 
to pressure the state for greater redistribution, which would come from taxing the 
wealthier class (Meltzer and Richard 1983).
  
In response to redistributive pressures, the 
wealthy have greater incentives to engage in political corruption to avoid paying higher 
tax along with bureaucratic corruption to avoid tax payments. In this scenario, the poorer 
 7
citizens have fewer resources to keep the wealthy in check or monitor their behavior and 
are likely to receive poor services such as health and education from the state.  They are 
thus themselves more likely to be dependent on petty corruption to receive services 
because bureaucrats are in a better position to extort them in exchange for basic public 
services (You and Khagram 2004).  Additionally, You and Khargram (2004) show that in 
democracies, inequality is likely to have a greater impact on corruption than in 
dictatorships because the wealthier classes are forced to rely on corruption over 
repression of the masses.  Further, the greater number the poor, the more opportunities 
for vote buying during a political campaign. Based on this, we would anticipate that on 
average, higher levels of income inequality in Indian states are associated with higher 
levels of corruption.   
 
4. The Effect of Decentralization on Corruption 
         The impact of decentralization – whether political, financial or administrative - on 
corruption is a hotly contested topic.  India is a long-time federal system with state-level 
elected official and parliaments which are represented by both national and regional 
parties.  Today it contains a total of 28 states and 7 unit territories, most of which under 
the States Reorganization Act in 1956 were draw around linguistic lines5.  Each state is 
primarily responsible for issues such as law enforcement, education, public works and 
services, and hospital care within their borders.  On the one hand, Tanzi (2001) and 
others argue that fiscal decentralization might lead to greater levels of corruption, 
especially in developing countries, because local leaders are expected to be less 
                                                 
5 "States Reorganisation Act, 1956". Constitution of India. Commonwealth Legal Information Institute. 
http://www.commonlii.org/in/legis/num_act/sra1956250/. 
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competent than those at the national level and might be more prone to clientalism because 
of closer and more frequent contact with citizens.  Moreover, the lines of responsibility 
are more blurred than in a strict unitary, centralized system, thus voters do become more 
confused regarding to whom they should assign blame for corrupt politics.   Gerring and 
Thacker (2004) find empirical evidence in a cross-sectional study supporting this 
argument with respect to political decentralization. 
        On the other hand, the greater the political or fiscal decentralization, the closer the 
voters come to their politicians, which should increase accountability, encourage 
responsible governance and reduce corruption.  Provincially elected governments that are 
more responsible for collecting their own revenues via citizens in their state should be 
less inclined to rent-seeking than a regional government that is mainly subsidized by the 
central government – meaning that public officials are less accountable for their funds 
and policies.  Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Gurgur and Shah (2005) find empirical 
evidence for greater levels of decentralization being associated with lower corruption 
levels.  However, most of the tests of this hypothesis have been conducted using national 
level data on corruption and aggregated levels of decentralization.  India provides an 
excellent test case in that there are substantial variations in the level of decentralization – 
especially fiscal decentralization – among the states.  Thus it will be fruitful and 
interesting to test whether greater levels of in-state fiscal responsibility are correlated 
with higher or lower corruption across the sample.  
 
5. The Media 
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       Several studies have argued and found empirical evidence to support the idea that 
countries with greater media access and an independent free press have lower corruption 
at the national level, ceteris paribus (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005; 
Ahrend 2002).  At the provincial level, Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Francken et al (2005) 
demonstrate the media’s pivotal role in helping curb corruption in certain regions due to 
higher volume of radio listeners in Brazil and Madagascar respectively.  Since this 
analysis is examining a sample of state within one country, variations in press freedom 
are expected to be low to non-existent across regions.  However, one might expect that 
states with higher levels of media consumption might have a more informed public on 
political matters, thus building a population that is better suited to monitor and penalize 
corrupt behaviour in the public sector.   
 




        The ‘Indian Corruption Study’ was undertaken by Transparency International (TI) 
and the Centre for Media Studies (CMS) and released in October of 2005.  It is the largest 
corruption survey ever conducted, with a total of 14,405 respondents, spread over 151 
cities, 306 villages within 20 Indian states.  The surveyors received between 527 and 960 
respondents for each state.  In the majority of states, the distribution of respondents is 
skewed towards urban citizens by roughly a 2-1 ratio (see Table 1).   
         The focus of the study was on corruption in the public sector.  More specifically, it 
intended to capture the level of ‘petty corruption’ that the ‘common man’ faced in 
obtaining 11 different public services such as: Income tax bureaucracy, municipal 
services, judiciary, the Rural Financial Institution (RFI), Land Administration, police, 
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public schools, water suppliers, electricity suppliers, government hospitals and ration-
card suppliers.  The survey does not contain information regarding the extent to which a 
business must pay a bribe in order to obtain a permit or the extent to which high level 
‘state capture’-type corruption exists.  However, the content of the survey lends itself 
quite nicely to a comparison of state-by-state levels of corruption in India in that it is the 
provincial and local governments in India – not the central government – that mainly 
provide these services in question.  Additionally, another advantage of the survey method 
in corruption analysis is that it does not rely as much on the comparative strength of the 
legal systems across states as much as a ‘hard measure’, such as the number of yearly 
convictions for example.   
     The methodology of the survey was also unique in the sense that it based the results 
on both perceptions of petty corruption and actual experiences with having to pay ‘extra 
money’ to obtain basic services.  Secondly, the survey also obtained information 
regarding the outlook of the service provider.  On the later point, the researchers wanted 
to find out certain aspects of the service providers, such as how monopolistic the services 
were, how often the bureaucrats interacted with the public, and how essential the services 
are the average person.       
***Table 1 here*** 
       Table 1 displays the 11 services in question in the survey and their respective 
composite score based on the percentage of citizens who had a personal experience with 
corruption or perceive the service to be corrupt.  Clearly, the more ‘need based’ services 
provide greater opportunities for rent seeking in India, as roughly half the respondents 
have personally paid a bribe to a Land Administration or local judiciary bureaucrat and a 
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startling 80 percent have had to pay a bribe to law enforcement.  While public hospitals, 
electricity service and PDS department are perceived by a majority of respondents to be 
corrupt in practice, less than 30 percent have actually had first-hand experience with 
paying a bribe.  In building the composite index, the respondent’s experiences and 
perceptions of corruption in the 11 different public service areas were weighted 60 and 40 
percent respectively.  Upon compiling all responses from each of the 20 states, the mean 
score is 4.88 with a standard deviation of 1.04 and the scores range from 2.40 (Kerala) to 
6.95 (Bihar), with higher scores indicating higher levels of corruption6.  Table 2 lists each 
state’s individual score, ranking and urban-rural distribution of respondents.   
 
***Table 2 about here*** 
Additional Data 
        While the survey data provides the dependent variable in the study, several other 
sources were used to obtain data to test the five hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 refers to 
wealth and education as factors that should be associated with lower corruption.  Gross 
state product per capita for each state (in billions of Rupees in 2004-2005) was taken 
from the Directorate of Economics & Statistics of respective State Governments within 
the Central Statistical Organization of India.  I proxy education levels in this study with 
the literacy rate in each state, which was obtained from a survey conducted by the 
International Institute of Population Sciences (IIPS) in India in 20077.   
                                                 
6 The scores in the survey range from 240 to 695.  I divided these by 100 to keep the range from 0-10. 
7 The survey results can be found at: http://www.nfhsindia.org/  
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        To test hypothesis 2, that more diverse states should have higher corruption on 
average, I constructed a Herfindel Index of religious fractionalization for each state in 
India based on the census data from 2001. The Herfindel Index is:  
, 
 ‘N’ is the number of religious groups (in this case 5 groups – Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Buddhist and Sikh make up approximately 98% of the population according to the 
census).  ‘S’ is the proportion of each group in each state (squared) and added together.  
It essentially measures the likelihood that two random people drawn from a particular 
state will have a different religious affiliation. The index is then subtracted from 1 and 
has a range of ‘0’ to ‘1’, with higher scores equating higher levels of religious diversity.  
Because many of India’s states were drawn up around linguistic lines, I feel religion was 
a better measure of diversity within states.  
        To test hypothesis 3, that greater levels of inequality are associated with higher 
levels of state-level corruption, I use the within-state Theil-Index of Indian 
Manufacturing sector wage inequality from the University of Texas Inequality Project 
(Galbraith 2008) from 1998, which is the most recent year available8.  Higher scores 
equal greater levels of income inequality.   
        Hypothesis 4 discusses the potential impact that greater levels of decentralization 
might have on corruption.  The concept of decentralization has been difficult at times to 
pin down in the literature, and there appears to be no universally accepted measure.  
Some studies on the effect of decentralization on corruption operationalize it as the ratio 
of non-central to central public employment (Gungar and Shah 2005), the share of non-
                                                 
8 For complete details, see: http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html  
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central government expenditures of total expenditures (Fismand and Gatti 2002), the 
presence of sub-national political units (Treisman 1999; Gerring and Thacker 2004) or 
the number of competing jurisdictions (Arikan 2004) for example.  I choose to measure 
decentralization in this study as the ratio of each state’s self-generate revenue to their 
total revenues.  There are several advantages to this measure.  One, it demonstrates the 
level of fiscal independence (or dependence) each region has from (or on) the central 
government.  Two, states that are using locally generated tax dollars to pay for local 
government projects and serves should in theory feel like they are more directly 
accountable for the performance and quality of the output of such services.  Conversely, 
state government that receive a high proportion of their revenues via federal transfers are 
for all intents and purposes spending the tax dollars of citizens in other regions of the 
country, and thus the link between the tax-payers and state governments is less direct 
than in states with  a higher proportion of in-state generated revenues.  The data on Indian 
state revenues is taken from Roa (2001). 
         Hypothesis 5 discusses the impact that the media has on corruption.  Since the study 
is at the state-level, we would not expect variations in press freedoms across state lines to 
be significant, since the Indian constitution renders Freedom of the Press implicit in the 
guarantee of freedom of speech and expression9.  Thus we would expect that the press’ 
impact on corruption would come from variations in access to the media across states.  
From the same survey that the IIPS completed in 2007, I take two measures.  First, I take 
the percentage of people who responded that they are exposed to the media at least once a 
                                                 
9 In Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.  In several court cases the high court in India has ruled in favor for 
universal freedom of the press though the constitution does not explicitly discuss it.  For example:  Brij Bhushan v. 
State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129; Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Sakal Papers Ltd. v. 
Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305; Bennett Coleman Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 
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week (via newspaper, radio or television).  Second, I take the percentage of household 
television ownership.   
        Finally, India’s states vary significantly with respect to size and population.  To 
control for these differences, I include the proportion of urban residents in each state 
along with the population density.   
 
Results 
        In table 3, I show a multivariate test of the hypotheses, which uses Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) cross sectional analysis for 20 Indian states in 2005.  Each model is 
estimated with robust standard errors.  Additionally, standardized beta coefficients are 
reported to display the relative impact that each explanatory variable has on the 
dependent variable (see Table 4).  The first model serves primarily as a baseline test, 
though I do include variations in income across states to test for part of H1.  As 
anticipated, wealthier states are on average less corruption and coefficient is significant at 
the 99% level of confidence.  An increase in per capita yearly income by one standard 
deviation is associated with a lower corruption score by .06, or roughly 5% of one 
standard deviation of the dependent variable.  The standardized coefficient however, 
shows the impact of the GSP per capita variable to be by far the largest in model 1 (-.89).  
Regarding the control variables, the more urban a state is, the more corruption on 
average, yet while the population density increases, the findings show that this is 
associated with lower corruption.   
***Table 3 about here*** 
***Table 4 about here*** 
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        Model 2 tests the relationship between literacy rates and corruption, controlling for 
population demographics across the sample.  The relationship is strongly significant and 
as anticipated, literacy rates have a negative relationship with the dependent variable.  In 
fact, according to the standardized coefficients, the impact of a one unit increase of 
literacy rates is 70 times larger than the other variables in the model.  Between the results 
of model 1 and 2, hypothesis 1 receives strong empirical support.   
        Models 3 and 4 test the impact of religious fractionalization and income inequality 
on corruption respectively.  I keep the control variables from models 1 and 2 and include 
GSP per capita as a control variable as well.  The coefficient for religious 
fractionalization is in fact in the opposite direction as anticipated, yet far from statistically 
significant.  Income inequality in model 4 is in the expected direction in that its sign is 
negative, yet the coefficient fails to reach the accept level of significance for safe 
interpretation.  However, in these two models, GSP per capita remains a strong predictor 
of corruption levels even with the inclusion of these two additional variables.   
       Models 5 through 7 test the effect of decentralization and media exposure on the 
dependent variable.  To avoid problems associated with multicollinearity10 due to a 
strong correlation between decentralization and GSP per capita (see appendix for 
descriptive statistics and correlation tables), I substitute literacy rates as a control in place 
of GSP per capita.  Decentralization shows to be a strongly significant estimator of 
corruption in India, with more self-reliant states having less corruption on average.  
Conversely, corruption is higher in regions that are more reliant on federal transfers for 
their revenues. 
                                                 
10 There are of course no issues of bias regarding multicollinearity, only that it inflates the standard errors 
of the models such that the significance of the coefficients in question may be underestimated.  
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        This demonstrates evidence for the idea that a state government will be more 
accountable to citizens and will be more apt to provide better services because of the 
more direct fiscal relationship between the tax-payers and sub-national government.  In 
models 6 and 7, I test whether greater exposure to the media and TV ownership have any 
significant relationship with levels of corruption.  According to the model, there appears 
to be no relationship between the proportion of TV owners in a state and the dependent 
variable (model 6) and while the variable capturing the amount of citizen media exposure 
(model 7) is in the predicted direction, it fails to reach statistical significance.   
          Of the five hypotheses, H1 and H4 received strong empirical support among the 
Indian states, meaning that greater affluence, higher literacy rates and greater levels of 
decentralization are all associated with lower levels of corruption in the sample.  Figures 
2, 3 and 4 graph each of these two-way relationships with a 95% confidence interval 
around the predicted line to provide a visual of how well the sample fits the predicted 
relationship. 
***Figures 2 – 4 about here*** 
 
Conclusion 
        This analysis has explored the relationship between five common explanations of 
corruption within the literature with corruption levels in Indian states using recently 
released survey data from 2005.  It has been the first study to systematically explore 
variations in levels of perceived and experienced corruption of everyday citizens in the 
world largest democracy.  Due to an admittedly limited amount of data – especially with 
respect to the dependent variable – a cross-sectional analysis was employed here with 20 
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of the 28 Indian states.  Of course it would be imprudent to make hard and fast sweeping 
generalizations about the problems India faces with respect to corruption based solely on 
these findings.  Thus it would be best to take these results into consideration, yet in a 
cautious manner.   
         With this caveat in mind, the econometric results of the study reveal several factors 
are systematically related with corruption in Indian state.  One, as many studies have 
shown prior to this analysis at both the central and sub-national level, wealthier states are 
less corrupt on average.  The Indian sample is no different in this respect.  The result is 
robust to a number of different model specifications throughout the analysis.  Two, states 
that provide better education (measured with literacy rates in the analysis) are less corrupt 
on average.  A more literate public is better equipped to monitor the behavior of public 
officials.  Together, these two results show strong empirical evidence for H1 in the case 
of India - that the hypothesis derived from Lipset (1960) and Huntington (1968) speaking 
to levels of modernization – applies strongly in this context.  Three, states that are more 
decentralized and fiscally independent are less corrupt on average.  Regions that are less 
dependent on the central government for their revenues are shown to provide better 
services and have more satisfied citizens.  State governments receiving less of their 
revenues directly from the citizens and more from the central level via transfers display 
more opportunities for rent-seeking in that these regional leaders might feel less of a 
responsibility to provide quality services to citizens.   
        From these results, we can derive two policy recommendations.  Although it is 
unrealistic to simply tell a government to ‘grow economically’, the findings do suggest 
that more literacy though education and more fiscally independent state governments are 
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less corruption.  Such measures should be taken into consideration in future fights to curb 
opportunities for rent-seeking in the public sector.  In addition, in the future, TI plans to 
do another round of surveys.  With the enactment of the ‘Right to Information Act’ of 
2005, which intends to force public utilities and services to make their transactions with 
customers transparent to the public, future research will be able to tell if such a law has 
had any significant impact on citizens perceptions or experiences with corruption.   
         While India on whole may score lower on income, education levels and corruption 
relative to other democracies, there is high degrees of variation within the country that is 
clearly overlooked when ignoring differences among the states themselves.  This study – 
as well as others that have looked into variations in government performance and 
corruption at the sub-national level – highlights the importance of expanding this 














Ades, Alberto, and Rafael Di Tella, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption,” American 
Economic Review, LXXXIX (1999), 982–993 
Ahrend, Rudiger  2002.  Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption.  DELTA 
Working Paper No. 2002-11 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain 
Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8:155-194. 
 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Yuliya V. Tverdova.  2003. Corruption, Political 
Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies.  
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 1: 91-10 
 
Arikan, G. Gulsun .  2004.  Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption? 
International Tax and Public Finance.  Volume 11, Number 2 / March: 175-195. 
 
Alt, James and David Lassen, The political economy of institutions and corruption in 
American States, Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (3) (2003), pp. 341–365 
 
Alt, James and David Lassen. Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence 
from American State Governments.   Economics & Politics, Vol. 20, Issue 1, pp. 33-61. 
 
Bliss, Christopher, and Rafael Di Tella, “Does Competition Kill Corruption,” Journal of 
Political Economy, CV (1997), 1001–1023. 
Brunetti, Aymo, and Beatrice Weder. 2003. A free press is bad news for corruption. 
Journal of Public Economics 87:1801-1824 
Charron, Nicholas. 2009. Government Quality and Vertical Power Sharing in 
Fractionalized States. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, (forthcoming) 
 
Del Monte, A. Papagni, E., (2007), The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional 
panel data analysis. European Journal of Political Economy 23(2): 379-396 
 
Ferraz, Claudio  and Frederico Finan  2008.   Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects 
of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 123, No. 2:703-745 
 
Fisman, R. and R. Gatti. 2002. Decentralization and corruption: evidence across 
countries. Journal of Public Economics 83:325-345.. 
 
Francken, N, B Minten, JFM Swinnen, K Mercierlaan.  2005.  Listen to the Radio! Media 
and Corruption: Evidence from Madagascar.   
 
 20
Gerring, J. and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role 
of Unitarism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 34:295-330 
 
Glaeser, E. L., and R. Saks, “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public Economics 
90(6) (2006), 1053–1073. 
 
Goel, Rajeev and Michael Nelson.  1998. Corruption and government size: a 
disaggregated analysis, Public Choice 97 (1):107–120 
 
Gurgur, Tugrul,  and Shah Anwar, "Localization & Corruption: Panacea or Pandora's 
Box?" (January 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3486. 
 
Gupta, Sanjeev, Hamid R. Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme. 2002. “Does Corruption 
Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?” Economics of Governance 3(1): 23-45 
 
Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena.  2002.  Corruption, economic growth, and income 
inequality in Africa.  Economics of Governance.  Volume 3, Number 3: 183-209  
 
Huntington, Samuel P.  1968. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press). 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. 
The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1):222-
279 
 
Lindstedt, Catharina and Daniel Naurin 2005.  Transparency and Corruption. The 
Conditional Significance of a Free Press.  Working paper: Quality of Government 
Institute, Göteborg Sweden 
 
Lipset, S. M. 1960.  Political man: the social bases of politics. (2nd ed. 1981). Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press 
 
Mauro, Paulo.  1995. Corruption and growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 681–
712 
 
Meltzer, Allan H., and Richard, Scott F. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of 
Government." Journal of Political Economy. 89 (October): 914-27. 
 
Rao, M. Govinda.  2001, “Fiscal Decentralization in Indian Federalism”, processed, 
Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan.  1975. The economics of corruption, Journal of Public 
Economics 4, pp. 187–20 
 
Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind Stolle.  2008.  The State and Social Capital: An Institutional 
Theory of Generalized Trust.  Comparative Politics. Vol. 40 Issue 4 Page 441-467 
 21
 
Tanzi, V. (2001) ‘Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization’, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Working Paper, 19, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment 
 
Transparency International.  2005.  India Corruption Study 2005.  Published by 
Transparency International India Lajpat Bhawan, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi  
 
Treisman, Daniel, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of 
Public Economics, LXXVI (2000), 399–457. 
 
University of Texas Inequality Project.  2008.  http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/about.html  
 
You, Jong-sung and Khagram, Sanjeev.  2004.  Inequality and Corruption. Hauser Center 



































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
GSP per capita (Billions of rupees)
95% CI Fitted values
Corruption Score































50 60 70 80 90
Literacy %
95% CI Fitted values
Corruption Score




























0 20 40 60 80
% States own Revues (out of total revenues)








Table 1: 11Services with respective experience and perception scores with corruption 
Services     Composite Index Experience Perception 
Need Based             
 RFI   22 19 25 
 Income Tax  35 20 62 
 Municipal Services  47 23 75 
 Judiciary (lower court)  59 47 81 
 Land Administration  59 48 79 
 Police (crime/ traffic)  77 80 88 
Basic             
 Schools (primary/ secondary) 26 18 45 
 Water supply  29 9 56 
 PDS (ration cards)  37 16 62 
 Electricity   39 20 67 
  Public Hospitals   42 27 67 
Note: Figures under ‘experience’ and ‘perception’ are in the percentage of respondents that either have actually paid 




Table 2: Composite Ranking of States and Make-up of Respondents 
Rank State    
Composite 
Corruption Score  Rural  Urban Total 
1 Kerala   2.40  253 455 708 
2 Himachal Pradesh  3.01  208 418 626 
3 Gujarat   4.17  276 466 742 
4 Andhra Pradesh  4.21  226 441 667 
5 Maharashtra  4.33  318 565 883 
6 Chhattisgarh  4.45  208 331 539 
7 Punjab   4.59  276 470 746 
8 West Bengal  4.61  301 519 820 
9 Orissa   4.75  222 521 743 
10 Uttar Pradesh  4.91  339 621 960 
11 Delhi  4.96  137 456 593 
12 Tamil Nadu  5.09  337 461 798 
13 Haryana   5.16  256 497 753 
14 Jharkhand  5.20  208 319 527 
15 Assam  5.42  242 473 715 
16 Rajasthan  5.43  261 481 742 
17 Karnataka  5.76  249 540 789 
18 Madhya Pradesh 5.84  244 450 694 
19 Jammu & Kashmir 6.55   555 555 




Table 3- OLS Regression Model        
     Model    
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Controls        
Urban-Rural  0.0002** 0.00004 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 
Population  (2.87) (0.16) (2.62) (2.73) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) 
Population Density  -0.154*** -0.043 -0.106 -0.091 -0.068 -0.109 -0.104 
      (-3.02) (-0.68) (-1.31) (-0.84) (-1.15) (-1.06) (-1.14) 
GSP per capita H1 -0.062***  -0.063** -0.071***  -0.068* -0.061* 
   (-3.25)  (-3.17) (-3.01)  (-1.93) (-1.91) 
Literacy Rate H1  -0.086***   -0.074***   
    (-4.01)   (-3.01)   
Religious Frac. H2   -0.104     
     (-0.11)     
Income Inequality H3    0.046    
      (1.21)    
Decentralization H4     -0.021**   
(revenues)      (-2.75)   
          
TV ownership H5      -0.0006  
        (-0.12)  
Media Exposure H5       -0.011 
                  (-0.42) 
Obs.   20 19 20 18 17 19 19 
R²   0.35 0.51 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.4 0.4 
 Prob > F              .0004   0.03 




Table 4 - Standardized Coefficients         
      Urban ratio Density GSP p.c. Literacy Key IV 
Model 1 (GSP per capita) 0.55 -0.23 -0.89***   
Model  2 (Literacy rates) 0.01 -0.009  -0.72***  
Model 3 (Religious Frac.) 0.55 -0.23 -0.89**  -0.019 
Model 4 (Inequality)  0.56 -0.2 -0.99***  -0.34 
Model 5 (Decentralization) 0.06 -0.14  -0.59*** -0.4** 
Model 6 (TV ownership) 0.13 -0.23 -0.7*  0.009 




Variables, Sources and Descriptive Statistics       
Variable   Description      Source Mean (St. dev.) 
Corruption level of experienced and perceived corruption Transparency  4.88 (1.04)  
  in 20 Indian States (survey data - 2005)  International   
GSP per cap. Gross state product per capita (2004 - in Billions of Rupees) Central Statistic  35.91 (22.41) 
      Organization of India  
Inequality  Theil-Index of manufacturing wage inequality within each University of Texas 12.29 (8.51)  
  Indian state (1998)   Inequality Project   
Literacy rates Percentage of population that is literate (2007) IIPS 71.41 (9.35)  
Decentralization The proportion of self-generated revenues for each state   Rao (2001) 52.38 (28.59) 
  of the total revenues (1998)     
Religious Fractionalization A Herfindel Index for each state based on the distribution Author -  from the .338 (.201)  
  of 5 religious groups (2001)  Indian 2001 census   
Television ownership Proportion of household that own a TV (2007) IIPS 48.43 (15.59) 
Media exposure Proportion of population who claim to be exposed at  IIPS 80.85 (10.19) 
  least once a week to TV, radio or newspaper media (2007)    
Urban/rural pop. Total urban over the total rural population (2001) Central Statistic  3.27 (2.23)  
      Organization of India  
Pop. Density Number of people per square kilometer  Central Statistic  879.5 (2015.96) 
      Organization of India  
Legislature Equals '1' if bicameral, '0' if unicameral   Indiastat.com .21 (.41)   
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